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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that economic voting is not limited to first-order elections and also can be observed 
in local elections (usually considered as second-order). Though local governments do not have the 
power to shape the macro-economic policy of the state, they may have some instruments to influence 
the well-being of their regions. Moreover, voters may perceive them as accountable for the state of 
the economy in the region and punish or reward them in local elections on basis of the economic 
trends. Lithuania appears to be a quite interesting case in which to test these theoretical arguments. 
Party identification and cleavages are quite weak here: therefore economic voting can be expected 
to provide at least some explanation of voting (it should not be shadowed by other social factors). 
Six local municipal council elections were held in Lithuania since the transition to democracy: the 
first were held in 1995 and the last in 2011. While controlling for important political-contextual 
factors, this paper strives to compare the impact of economic voting at Lithuania’s municipal elections 
across time five separate time periods. Results of the empirical analysis reveal that Lithuanians are 
learning the economic vote with unemployment being more significant as a factor in explaining 
changes in votes for dominant parties in the municipal councils in the more recent period than in 
the first several elections. A referendum effect is also observed: parties that belong to the national 
government parties are punished more during economic downturns.
Key-words: economic voting, local (municipal) elections, change(s) in votes, mayor(al) parties.
INTRODUCTION
Economic voting is one of the three main theoretical explanations of voting behaviour, 
alongside party identification and socio-structural theories. It was quite heavily investigated 
in Western democracies (literature on other democracies has also been expanding, especially 
in the last two decades) with a focus on first-order (parliamentary and presidential) elections. 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, p.183) convey the essence of economic voting theory simply: 
if the economy is doing well, citizens vote for the government (reward effect); in an opposite 
economic situation, the vote is against the government (punishment effect). Responsibility 
hypothesis presupposes that voters hold the government responsible for the economy 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, p.114): those who govern will be punished by voters for the 
economy’s poor performance, and rewarded for good economic performance. 
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The explanatory power of economic voting theory depends on the importance of 
elections and particularly on political context: the economy is expected to have a greater 
impact on incumbent votes when the incumbent’s responsibility for the economy is very clear 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993, p.410). First, the fragmentation of party systems and governing 
coalitions is important. It is argued that clarity of responsibility is inversely related to the number 
of parties forming a coalition: increases in the number of parties weaken economic voting 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000, p.209). Second, economics ought to matter more in elections 
when representatives of the dominant institutions of the political system (according to the 
constitutional norms and de facto established relations between state authorities) are elected; 
these institutions have the most power to shape the macroeconomic policies of the state (Tucker, 
2006, pp.56-61). These insights may lead to an assumption that economic voting theory does 
not provide explanations of voting in second-order elections as these elections do not decide the 
fate of the national executive government (Marsh, 1998, pp.591-593; Reif and Schmitt, 1980), 
especially in local elections where fragmented local government coalitions are norm.
However, theoretical arguments that economic voting could also occur in local elections 
(usually considered second-order) are possible: though local governments do not have power 
to shape the macro-economic policy of the state, they may have some instruments to influence 
the well-being of their regions. Moreover, voters may perceive them to be accountable for the 
worsening or improving state of the economy in the region and punish or reward accordingly 
at the ballot box in local elections. Lithuania appears to be quite an interesting case in 
which to test these theoretical arguments: party identification and cleavages (especially the 
linkages between social groups and particular parties) are quite weak here (Ramonaitė, 2007; 
Ramonaitė and Žiliukaitė, 2009). Economic voting can be expected to provide at least some 
explanation of voting (it should not be shadowed by other social factors) in local Lithuanian 
elections.
The first part of this paper discusses the theoretical possibilities of economic voting in 
local elections generally and also particularly in Lithuania. The second part presents the other 
relevant political-contextual factors that must also be accounted for in the analysis, alongside 
the economy. The third part of this paper presents a statistical analysis of all periods between 
the particular municipal elections in Lithuania since the transition to democracy: controlling 
for the other important factors (such as voter turnout and fragmentation of local party 
systems) in order to compare the impact of economic voting over time. For the entire time 
span of 1995 to 2011, data on municipal level unemployment was available. Unemployment 
rates are one of the most important indicators in economic voting studies, especially in post-
communist countries.  Therefore, it was possible to test whether the Lithuanian electorate 
responds to regional economic trends by punishing or rewarding the local governments. 
1. ECONOMIC VOTING IN LOCAL ELECTIONS: THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
At first sight, research on economic voting in local elections may appear more meaningful in 
countries where local governments have a relatively strong impact on economics. For example, 
in Belgium, 44.5 per cent of government investments are made by local governments, which 
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were also responsible for a 7.8 per cent raise in Belgian taxes (Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006, 
p.2287). In such a case, independent variables (economic) will be closely related to the 
policies of local governments (municipalities). As the local governments cannot influence the 
macroeconomic policy of the state, their focus is on the policy instruments at their disposal: 
the most obvious of which are local taxes. 
Jano Vermeir and Bruno Heyndels (2006) argue that local governments might even have 
some influence on such economic indicators as unemployment and income, or can simply be 
held responsible by voters for economic trends (even it has not enough power to influence 
them significantly). Hence it is worthwhile to include these factors in the statistical models: 
however, in their study of voting in Belgium’s local elections, Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) 
do not find a significant effect of macro-economic indicators. Rodrigo Martins and Francisco 
Jose Veiga (2010) provide different evidence: in Portuguese local elections, unemployment 
has a negative impact on the election performance of incumbents. This effect is more strongly 
manifested in regions where the local government includes political parties that also govern 
at the national level (Martins and Veiga, 2010). Therefore, it appears that local governments, 
in reality, could be held responsible for unemployment trends. 
One particular feature of second-order elections is very important here: “referendum 
effect,” meaning that local elections could be treated as an event where voters express their 
satisfaction or disdain with the policies conducted by the national government (Kluonis, 
2009; Marsh, 1998, pp.593-594). Hence during economic downturns, national government 
parties are expected to perform poorly in first-order and second-order elections. According 
to Michael Marsh, the time and location of a second-order election in the electoral cycle may 
also be important: whereas the popularity of the national government usually hits the lowest 
point in the middle of tenure, this is the exact time to expect national government parties to 
suffer their worst losses in a second-order election (Marsh, 1998, p.594).  
Therefore, although the logic of conditionality of economic voting suggests that the 
influence of the economy in local elections should be less clear, it seems that both theoretical 
and empirical incentives for a more detailed investigation into this phenomenon exist. On one 
hand, the electorate can reward or punish the local government for particular policies (for 
example, tax policy) and even hold the local government partly responsible for the region’s 
economic situation. On the other hand, on the basis of the theory of second-order elections, 
a municipal election could be treated as a referendum for evaluation the performance of the 
national government.
Resting on the previously presented theory and empirical examples, it is possible to 
discern the hypotheses aimed at the search for economic voting in Lithuanian local elections. 
However, certain specifics of the country context must be taken into account first: the 
peculiarities of local government and local elections obviously exert some influence on the 
formulation of hypotheses. Municipal council elections are the only direct elections held at 
the local government level in Lithuania. Hence the administrative and geographical unit of a 
municipality serves as the “smallest” possible case for observation1. (Furthermore, Lithuania’s 
1  In further presented analysis the notion of region equals a municipality. 
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municipal institutions are considered quite weak regarding both budget independence and 
tax policy autonomy (Mačiulytė and Ragauskas, 2007; Čivinskas and Tolvaišis, 2006; Davulis, 
2009).  Therefore, it is only possible to study the influence of macroeconomics on voting, 
even if it is acknowledged that the former is not quite dependent on the policies of municipal 
institutions. 
Some authors argue that in Lithuania, the “municipal council is incapable of luring the 
capital, entrepreneurs” (Čivinskas and Tolvaišis, 2006, p.87). However, a short exploration 
of the local media and the electoral promises of candidates in the 2011 municipal elections 
suggests that the electorate may have a different opinion. For example, Artūras Zuokas told 
voters in Vilnius,  “We will initiate the founding of ‘Vilnius Air’ airlines”2. Regimantas Baravykas, 
the candidate leading the Liberal and Centre Union’s list in the municipality of Ukmergė,said, 
“in our party, we have people of different professions, people that work thoughtfully. They 
know how to encourage business development, how to effectively utilize the budget”3. 
On other hand, it is necessary to emphasize one important characteristic of Lithuanian 
voters – they always punish the government in elections. All national governments, since the 
1990 parliamentary elections, have experienced losses: voters have never been observed 
rewarding the government, regardless of whether the economy was worsening or improving. 
This trend of constantly punishing government in elections is observed in all post-communist 
Central-Eastern European countries. Andrew Roberts defines this phenomenon as “hyper-
accountability,” and also notices that governments tend to lose fewer votes when the economy 
is improving and more when it is worsening (Roberts, 2008). Therefore, it may be expected 
that national government will always be negatively affected in municipal elections: but less 
so during a rising economy, and more so during economic downturns (effect of referendum, 
adjusted to the peculiarities of post-communist context).
Four main hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part are introduced. Before presenting 
the more detailed operationalisation of variables, it has to be noted that the responsibility 
object was chosen with reference to an observation made by J. A. Tucker of dominant parties 
in coalitions (Tucker, 2006, p.60): it is most likely to find the effect of economy’s influence 
while analysing particularly their votes. Moreover, it is strived to explain particular changes in 
votes: hence, emphasis is placed on the factors that influence the losses and gains of votes in 
comparison to the last elections. 
Hypothesis 1: The economic situation in a region (municipality) is expected to be positively 
associated with the change in votes (in municipal council elections) for the party that is 
dominant in the municipality’s governing coalition: the greater positive economic change is, 
the greater probability of a reward (and vice versa).
Hypothesis 2: in periods when the economic situation in the country is worsening, it 
is expected to find significant differences in votes garnered between the parties that are 
2  Webpage of Coalition of Artūras Zuokas and Vilnius. [Looked at 2011 01 23] <http://programa2011.taip.lt/
stiprus-miestas.html>
3  Ligita Juodvalkienė, „Rinkėjams artėja apsisprendimo metas“. Ukmergės žinios, 2010. [Looked at 2011 01 23] 
< http://www.ukzinios.lt/archyvas-mainmenu-40/1162-rinkjams-artja-apsisprendimo-metas.html>)
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dominant in municipal councils and also belong to the national government, and parties that 
are dominant in the municipal councils, but at the national level are in opposition: parties that 
are governing at the national level should lose more votes in municipal elections than parties 
which are not governing at the national level.
Alongside these hypotheses, another one is presented in relation to the inexperience of 
Lithuania’s electorate. Voters in some post-communist democracies may not behave rationally 
in the first decade(s) after the transition to democracy, especially in municipal elections: 
their motivations may be heavily influenced by the stress of the triple (social, economic, 
and political) transformation or by the rhetoric of populism-oriented local leaders. However, 
rationality of economic voting may be developed over time in relation to the consolidation of 
democracy and the overall success of the post-communist transformation.
Hypothesis 3: the influence of regional economic trends on voting in municipal elections 
should become more significant over time.
2. OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS: CONTROLLING THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
In economic voting studies, statistical models usually incorporate variables other than 
indicators of economy’s performance that could potentially influence voting. Controlling the 
influence of other factors enables researchers to assess the unique economic impact more 
reliably. Furthermore, Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000, p.114) note that economics usually 
explain about a third of variance in voting functions. Therefore, it is quite natural to “walk the 
extra mile” in order to explain what is not accounted for by economic factors. 
In macro-level studies that aim to explain voting (popularity) for particular political 
forces and candidates, political variables usually represent certain events, which could 
negatively affect the gains of a party or candidate (for example, corruption scandals, the 
country’s involvement in war). They are most often coded as dummy-variables. If the study 
strives to explain not just the success or failure of the governing forces (but also of other 
political powers), variable that measures if a particular political party or candidate is part of 
the national executive government (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000) may be included. It is 
necessary to include such factors into the analysis of voting at local elections in Lithuania to 
test hypothesis 2 . Unfortunately, collecting reliable data on political scandals at the municipal 
level in Lithuania is a very complicated task – though the author of this article agrees that in 
Lithuania this factor may hold considerable influence. 
In studies of electoral instability, voter turnout is often taken into account: according to 
Bartolini and Mair, it is one of the variables potentially explaining electoral volatility. More 
important than the actual level of voter turnout is change: the greater the difference in voter 
turnout between two elections, the greater the possibility that a disproportion effect will 
manifest (proportions of voters according to votes casted for particular parties will change) 
(Bartolini and Mair, 2007 (1990), p.44).  Whereas the measure of electoral volatility is an 
aggregation of changes in the votes (percentages) cast for all parties, voter turnout could also 
be used while explaining alterations in a certain party’s votes. Theoretically, low voter turnout 
and decreases in voter turnout are useful to parties with stable support from a particular 
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segment of the electorate: loyal voters who self-identify with the party and are potentially 
more inclined to show up at elections. It must be noted that in Lithuania, regional level voting 
patterns (inclination to consistently vote for the same parties) are observably more stable than 
national level patterns. In such a context, the influence of voter turnout may be important for 
the dominant party.
Another important variable in studies of electoral stability is party system format. 
Pedersen (1979) first demonstrated that format (in a general sense, the concept refers to the 
party system fragmentation) and its change is one of the factors explaining electoral volatility. 
Considering that the Lithuanian party system is characterized by quite high fragmentation 
and instability levels (Jastramskis, 2010), inclusion of this variable appears as a quite logical 
decision. The fragmentation (party system format) factor is important because it helps to 
partly control another feature of the Lithuanian party system: a visible trend in the success of 
new parties. The supply of parties in Lithuania is constantly renewed: new organizations are 
founded almost perpetually. Voters react quite favourably, and give a considerable share of 
their votes to such political powers at each parliamentary election. Hence, including a variable 
that measures change in party system fragmentation controls a factor that is otherwise quite 
difficult to measure.
It may seem that variables and theories about their role in the local elections, presented 
in this part, are “borrowed” from national-level studies about party systems without 
questioning whether the same mechanisms work at the level of regional party systems and 
local elections. However, referring to Reif and Schmitt, first-order and second-order elections 
cannot be completely separated from each other – they are both characterized by similar (if 
not identical) party systems, and the same parties participate in both of them (Marsh, 1998, 
pp.591-593; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Furthermore, existing studies suggest that trends in 
Lithuania’s national party system tend to materialise in the municipal council elections as well. 
Mainly by analysing the results of 2002 municipal council election (but also paying attention 
to the preceding ones), Lukošaitis (2003) detects rising fragmentation (at the national level 
this trend is visible since the 2000 parliamentary elections) both at the general election results 
and at the municipal level.
3. EMPIRICAL STUDY: ECONOMIC VOTING IN LITHUANIA’S MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
ELECTIONS
The first part of this section presents how variables (the ones used in the empirical analysis) 
were operationalised. A description of method and data is also given. The second section 
contains a quantitative analysis: the previously presented hypotheses are tested.
3 . 1  M e t h o d  a n d  va r i a b l e s 
In economic voting studies, the dependent variable is usually the popularity of the 
responsibility object (party, politician, coalition, etc.), votes, or change in votes. Therefore, 
in the operationalisation it is important to decide what the responsibility object is and which 
attribute will be measured. Considering the latter aspect, in this study, the dependent variable 
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is percentage of change in votes (percentages are counted from all voters that participated in 
particular elections) between two elections. Hence, a negative sign means that a party got a 
lesser share of votes than in previous elections (decrease in percentage points) and a positive 
sign refers to a greater share of votes than in previous elections (increase in percentage 
points).
While formulating the hypotheses, it was decided that the dominant party in the coalition 
would be treated as a responsibility object. It is necessary to define this concept more 
precisely: which party is dominant in the municipal council? In Lithuania, at the municipal 
level it is quite easy to conceptualize such political power: the one that holds the mayoral 
post. Especially because of the hierarchical nature of Lithuanian municipalities, it is the most 
important post in local government. Moreover, the mayor could be seen as the “face” of a 
municipal council: the party that controls this post is the most visible to voters. 
For the 1995-2011 period, the Statistics Department of Lithuania provides data on one 
economic indicator at the level of municipalities: unemployment rate (per cent).4  It is well 
suited to the economic voting hypotheses: unemployment in economic voting studies is 
considered one of the “big two” variables (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, p.114). This economic 
factor is operationalised as a change, measured by percentage points.  The indicator’s value at 
the first year of the analysed period is subtracted from the value of the year before the second 
elections of a period (municipal elections in Lithuania usually are organized in the first quarter 
of the year). For example, if 1997-2000 is analysed and in municipality X unemployment was 
seven per cent in 1999 and five per cent in 1997, the value of this independent variable is two 
percentage points. 
 The operationalisation of part of the political-contextual variables is quite straightforward 
and was implicit in the second part. Being part of the national government is operationalised 
as a standard dummy variable: 1 – if attribute exists, 0 – if not. Change of voter turnout is 
measured by subtracting the value of the period’s first elections from the respective value 
of the period’s second elections (positive sign refers to the increased voter turnout, negative 
means that voter turnout decreased). 
Party system fragmentation is usually measured with the Laakso-Taagepera index of the 
effective number of parties (Molinar, 1991, p.1383). However, serious arguments in favour of 
simply counting parties and applying a certain criterion of threshold (for example, all parties 
that receive more than 2 per cent of votes are counted) exist. According to Pappalardo (2007, 
p.725), the Laakso-Taagepera index creates an abstraction and it does not measure the real 
concentration of parties that is determined by the casted votes.  Also taking into account that 
the variable of fragmentation change strives to control the factor of party supply, a second 
measurement technique was chosen. At the municipal level, party system fragmentation 
was measured by the number of parties with at least one seat in the council. Such criterion 
coincides with the boundary of electoral threshold: in Lithuania’s municipal council elections 
four per cent threshold is applied to parties and 6 per cent to coalitions. Again, the variable 
4  Measured as a share of registered unemployed persons in the working age population.
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included into statistical analysis (fragmentation change) is measured by subtracting the value 
after the period’s first elections from the respective value after the second elections. It must be 
noted that such operationalisation is also convenient because the units are easily interpreted: 
for example, value “2” means that number of parties in municipal council increased by two 
(respectively “-2” reflect the decrease of the relevant parties by two).
In the following sub-part, analysis of voting for mayoral parties (as explained above, 
measured as percentage point changes in votes) in the Lithuania’s local elections is presented. 
Six local elections (to municipal councils) were held since the transition to democracy: the 
first in 1995 and the last in 2011. Hence, it was possible to analyse five separate periods 
between elections: each of them corresponds to a separate sample of cases (and a separate 
OLS regression model). Using exactly the same independent variables and controlling for the 
impact of political-contextual factors, it was possible to compare the role of economic voting 
across time. Data on elections was gathered from the Central Electoral Commission of the 
Republic of Lithuania; data on unemployment was provided by the Statistics Department of 
Lithuania; the author collected data regarding whether municipal parties were part of the 
national government.
3 . 2  E m p i r i ca l  a n a l y s i s :  e v i d e n c e  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  e co n o m i c  v o t i n g 
Regression models in the Table 1 present the results of analysis for all the periods between 
the previous municipal elections in Lithuania. Non-standardized regression coefficients 
altogether with their significance and standard errors (in parentheses) are displayed. Since 
our dependent variable measures the absolute change in parties’ vote share between two 
elections, its variation could be driven by the party size and this may bias the results of the 
regression analysis. In order to control for this, a variable that measures the parties’ electoral 
support (simple vote share in percentage) in the first period election (that took place in the 
beginning of the electoral period) is added to models. This ensures that the party size-driven 
variation is accounted.
As it was expected, unemployment is non-significant in Models 2 and 3 (1997-2000 and 
2000-2002). The signs of B coefficients are also in the opposite direction than expected if 
mayoral parties were held responsible for the economic situation in the region: as the 
negative change in unemployment means that it is declining (the economy is getting 
better), the coefficient should also be negative (an increase in unemployment in a particular 
municipality will increase the possibility that the dominant party will lose votes). However, 
an unemployment rate change is statistically significant in the model that aims to explain 
changes in votes won by the mayoral parties in 1995-1997; moreover, the variable’s coefficient 
is positive (contrary to expected relationship). How to explain this phenomenon?
Particularities of national politics in Lithuania may explain this “anomaly,” when mayoral 
parties gain more votes (in comparison to the last municipal election) in regions where 
unemployment is increasing more: the zero-order correlation between two variables is 
statistically significant and of average strength (Pearson’s R=0.342, p<0.05). An absolute 
majority of mayor posts in this period was controlled by parties that were in national 
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opposition for the longer part of period. The ruling Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania 
(DLPL) had difficulties coping with the economic challenges of the post-transition (to 
democracy) period. Moreover, in the beginning of 1996 a serious banking scandal involving 
the private interests of the prime minister heavily damaged the popularity of and trust in this 
party. A new parliamentary election was held in October 1996 and was won by the opposition 
parties, the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives (HU-LC) and the Lithuanian Christian 
Democrats (LCD).  This new government was sworn in before the 1997 municipal elections, 
which were held in March 1997. Voters in the regions that experienced the greater extent of 
the economic decline from 1995 to 1997 probably had more incentive to vote for the new 
government parties (they won mayoral posts in an absolute majority of municipalities): hence 
responsibility for the declining economy was attributed to the outgoing national government 
(DLPL), not to the local governments.
Regarding the earlier periods, political-institutional variables are significant only in the 
second model. The impact of fragmentation change could be explained by shifting patterns 
in the Lithuanian party system: rising fragmentation and increasing instability (Jastramskis, 
2010). A change in voter turnout is important here because the majority of mayoral posts in 
this period were controlled by the HU-LC. This party has the most loyal voters in Lithuania 
(Ramonaitė and Žiliukaitė, 2003), hence it is natural that the HU-LC is particularly affected 
by fluctuations in voter turnout (a negative sign means when voter turnout rises, the party 
receives less votes). However, taking into account both the un-standardised and Beta 
coefficients, being part of the national government exerted the most influence on the change 
in votes for the mayoral parties in this period: controlling other variables, being part of the 
national government cost more than 12.56 per cent of votes. Again, this could be explained 
by trends at the national level: the economy in the country deteriorated (unemployment 
rates increased in all municipalities) between this period’s municipal elections and clarity 
of responsibility at the national level was sufficient because of the relatively stable party 
composition of government.5 In this context, a referendum effect manifested: during the 
economic downturn, the electorate punished the parties that were governing at the national 
level.
Table 1 also presents the results of regression analysis for the two more recent periods 
between municipal elections in Lithuania: 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 Analysis reveals that 
Hypothesis 1 is supported by empirical evidence in these periods:  regional unemployment 
actually exerts some influence on Lithuania’s local elections, negatively affecting votes for 
the mayoral parties when unemployment increases and vice versa (coefficients are in the 
expected direction and are statistically significant). Hence it appears that Hypothesis 3 also 
receives empirical support: Lithuanians are learning the economic vote in local elections, 
as the influence of regional unemployment on voting in municipal elections has become 
more significant over time. It is interesting that in the last period (2007-2011) the change in 
5  HU-LC ruled in coalition with junior partner LCD for the greater part of the term.  LCD withdrew their sup-
port for the government in 1999.
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regional unemployment was the most important factor (see Beta coefficients). This is very 
interesting since the 2007-2011 period could be considered as very similar to the 1997-2000 
period: general economic downturn with increased unemployment in all municipalities and 
quite sufficient clarity of responsibility at the national level (the party composition of the 
government remained stable for the longer part of the municipal council tenure). Yet, during 
TABLE 1: Influence of economic and political-contextual factors on the change in votes of the 
dominant party in the municipality, OLS regression (non-standardized regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parentheses)
Model nr. 1.
Change in 
votes of the 
dominant 
party in the 
municipality, 
year 1995-1997 
Model nr. 2.
Change in 
votes of the 
dominant 
party in the 
municipality, 
year 1997-2000
Model nr. 3.
Change in 
votes of the 
dominant 
party in the 
municipality, 
year 2000-2002
Model nr. 4.
Change in 
votes of the 
dominant 
party in the 
municipality, 
year 2002-2007
Model nr. 5.
Change in 
votes of the 
dominant 
party in the 
municipality, 
year 2007-2011
Unemployment 
(change)
1.86* 
(0.83)
0.31 
(0.75)
1.37
(0.83)
-0.73*
(0.27)
-1.71**
(0.6)
Fragmentation 
(change)
0.72 
(0.63)
-3.2 *
(1.09)
-0.98
(1.23)
-3.34***
(0.7)
-1.81*
(0.8)
Voter turnout 
(change)
0.19 
(0.22)
-1.13 *
(0.31)
-0.54
(0.52)
0.13
(0.16)
0.2
(0.41)
National 
government6
- -12.56***
(3.36)
-0.93
(3.01)
-2.68
(1.8)
-6.3**
(2.21)
Vote share in first 
election
0.01 
(0.11)
-0.53***  
(0.1)
-0.15 
(0.11)
-0.12
(0.07)
-0.14
(0.08)
Adjusted R² 0.082 0.613 0.013 0.35 0.256
Statistical 
significance level
*p<0,05,  **p<0,01, ***p<0,001
N 467 558 60 599 60
Data source: The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania and Statistics Depart-
ment of Lithuania; part of the data was collected by author. 
6  In period 1995-1997 only in one municipal council was a dominant party that also belonged to the national 
government (for the most part of the period).
7  In period 1995-1997 Lithuania had 56 municipalities: however, only for 46 of them data on unemployment 
was available.
8  In 1997 Lithuania had 56 municipalities. During the reform in 2000 five new municipalities were established 
and one abolished. Whereas the municipal reform was executed particularly in the analyzed period and values 
of variables of the same cases of observation (ir order to measure the change) at two time points are needed, 
those six municipalities were removed from analysis. The geographical boundaries of other municipalities that 
were affected by the reform do not match perfectly (comparing the boundaries in 1997 and 2000). However it 
did not have much influence on the results of analysis: even if all of such cases (municipalities that had been 
reformed) were removed, the significance of coefficients remains the same. 
9  Neringa’s municipally is not included into analysis because of the special circumstances in period 2002-2007: 
after the death of  long-time mayor Stasys Mikelis his coalition crumbled and lost 39.7 percent points of votes. 
Lots of coalition’s politicians joined other parties. 
110  Mažvydas Jastramskis
the 1997-2000 period, national level factors (being part of the national government) do not 
overshadow the influence of regional unemployment: both factors uniquely impact changes 
in votes for the mayoral parties.
What about the 2 hypothesis? Based on the presented models, it appears that a negative 
referendum effect can be observed – the electorate punishes the parties that are dominant 
in the municipal council and also belong to the national government precisely when the 
economy worsens (1997-2000, 2007-2002), but in the times of economic recovery, voters are 
reluctant to reward them (2000-2002, 2002-2007). Additional arguments for the dominance 
of a negative referendum altogether with the support for hypothesis 2 are given by comparing 
mean changes in votes between two types of samples (Table 2). The first sample is comprised 
of cases when the dominant party in the municipal council also belongs to the national 
government. The second sample includes all remaining parties that hold a mayor’s office 
(parties that do not belong to the national government at the respective analysed period).
When compared to other political forces, parties of the national government clearly lose in 
municipal elections when the state of the economy is worsening (hypothesis 2 is supported). 
If, in the 1997-2000 period, in all the municipalities where they held a mayor’s post these 
parties lost 17.8 per cent of votes on average, then other parties even won 2.9 per cent of 
votes more on average! In the other period of economic downturn, 2007-2011, the difference 
between the parties that belong to the national government and other parties is not as large, 
but is still in the expected direction and statistically significant. A comparison of two samples in 
periods 2000-2002 and 2002-2007 show no significant differences, supporting the hypothesis 
2: in periods when the economic situation in the country is improving, the electorate do not 
differentiate between parties that are dominant in municipal councils and also belong to the 
national governments, and parties that are dominant in the municipal councils, but are in 
opposition at the national level.
TABLE 2: Mean differences between changes in votes for parties that belong to the national go-
vernment and changes in votes for other parties in municipal council elections (only parties that 
hold a mayoral post are included in samples)
Mean of 
changes in 
votes,
1997-2000 
Mean of 
changes in 
votes,
2000-2002 
Mean of 
changes in 
votes,
2002-2007 
Mean of 
changes in 
votes,
2007-2011
Dominant party in the 
municipality + belongs to the 
national government
-17.82 (N=37) 1.38 (N=23) -2.57(N=17) -4.72
(N=24)
Other dominant parties in 
municipality
2.92(N=18) 2.016 (N=37) -1.96(N=42) 1.13
 (N=36)
T-value -4.59*** -0.21 -0.25 -2.36*
Statistical significance level *p<0,05,  **p<0,01, ***p<0,001
Data source: Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania; part of the data was 
collected by author. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite local elections usually being treated as second-order, and regardless of weak municipal 
institutions in Lithuania, it appears that the electorate partly assigns the responsibility of 
the region’s (municipality’s) macroeconomic situation to the party that is dominant in the 
municipal council (the one that holds the mayor’s office). Results of empirical analysis reveal 
that Lithuanians are learning the economic vote, with unemployment being more significant 
(as a factor explaining voting) in the more recent period than in the first several elections: 
the more regional unemployment increases, the harsher the punishment is for the party 
that is dominant at the municipal council (holds mayor post). Moreover, referendum effect 
is also observed in second-order elections: When the economy is declining, the Lithuanian 
electorate clearly tends to punish national government parties (in comparison to other 
parties) in municipal elections.  However, when the economy is getting better, differences in 
changes in votes for opposition parties and those that belong to the national government are 
not significant.
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that economic voting theory is not limited 
to the analysis of first-order elections: it can also explain voting patterns in local elections. 
Even if local governments do not have much power to shape the macro-economic trends of 
their regions, the influence of the economy can be manifested in two ways: 1) governmental 
parties may be punished (or rewarded) for national policies in the municipal elections; 2) the 
electorate can attribute responsibility to the parties that are dominant in the local institutions. 
Both of these trends seem to receive empirical support in Lithuania, even controlling for the 
impact of other important political-contextual factors. Moreover, it seems that in a context 
of weak party identification and unsteady cleavages, the role of economics in local elections 
may increase over time.
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